Mark Finchem v Katie Hobbs dismissed by corrupt and/or incompetent judge Melissa Julian, Katie Hobbs clearly violated AZ statute 38-503 B, Judge only quotes 38-503 A
Mark Finchem v Katie Hobbs dismissed by corrupt and/or incompetent judge Melissa Julian, Katie Hobbs clearly violated AZ statute 38-503 B, Judge only quotes 38-503 A
Mark Finchem v Katie Hobbs dismissed by corrupt and/or incompetent judge Melissa Julian, Katie Hobbs clearly violated AZ statute 38-503 B, Judge only quotes 38-503 A
Judge Melissa Iyer Julian of the Maricopa County Superior Court is clearly corrupt and or incompetent.
The following will only examine her analysis and ruling on the misconduct of Katie Hobbs claims.
From the ruling
“F. Misconduct
Finally, Mr. Finchem contests the election under § 16-672(A)(1). That subsection permits election challenges “[f]or misconduct on the part of election boards or any members thereof in any of the counties of the state, or on the part of any officer making or participating in a canvas for a state election.” As with illegal vote contests, a contest based on “misconduct” cannot survive dismissal if predicated only “upon public rumor or upon evidence about which a mere theory, suspicion, or conjecture may be maintained.” Hunt, 19 Ariz. at 263-64. Errors and omissions in the election process also cannot sustain a “misconduct” claim in the absence of fraud or allegations that the error affected the election result. Findley, 35 Ariz. at 269.
Mr. Finchem asserts that Ms. Hobbs engaged in the following instances of “misconduct” by:
(1) failing to recuse herself after her opponent expressed a “perceived a conflict of interest”;
(2) failing to ensure proper certification of the ballot tabulating machines and software;
(3) “threatening county officials with criminal charges and indictment for failure to certify a defective election process.”
(4) Flagging alleged misinformation posted by Mr. Finchem’s Twitter account.
None of these alleged acts constitutes “misconduct” sufficient to survive dismissal.
1. Recusal/Perceived Conflict
Mr. Finchem first alleges that Ms. Hobbs “had an ethical duty to recuse herself” after her gubernatorial opponent “perceived a conflict of interest” and then “repeatedly and publicly called for Ms. Hobbs to recuse herself.” The only authority cited in the Amended Statement is to A.R.S. § 38-503, which prohibits self-dealing by public employees.
These are not well-pled facts; they are legal conclusions masquerading as alleged facts. As such, this court is not obliged to assume their truth. See Jeter, 211 Ariz. 386, 389, ¶ 4. Further, and even as “legal conclusions,” Arizona law does not support them.
Section 38-503 applies to public officers who have a “substantial interest in any contract, sale, purchase or service.” A.R.S. § 38-503(A). Recusal is required only when a public officer or employee has a “nonspeculative pecuniary or proprietary interest, either direct or indirect, other than a remote interest.” A.R.S. § 38-502(11). Put simply, “[p]ecuniary means money and proprietary means ownership.” Shepherd v. Platt, 177 Ariz. 63, 65 (App. 1993). Seeking or holding a public office does not grant elected officials a financial or ownership interest in the job they hold or seek. To the contrary, “the nature of the relation of a public officer to the public is inconsistent with either a property or a contract right. Every public office is created in the interest and for the benefit of the people, and belongs to them.” Ahearn v. Bailey, 104 Ariz. 250, 254 (1969) (citation omitted).
The plain terms of the self-dealing statute did not require the Secretary’s recusal merely because she was seeking election at the same time, she carried out her election duties as a public officer. Arizona law does not recognize a “pecuniary or proprietary interest” in either the office she held or in the office she sought.
Mr. Finchem failed to cite any other rule, statute, or Arizona appellate decision that imposes an “ethical” or “legal” duty upon an election official to recuse herself from carrying out her official duties when she is also a candidate for re-election or election to a different public office. And there is no “presumption” under Arizona law that the Secretary committed misconduct in the election canvass merely because her opponent “perceived” an earlier conflict of interest.”
“public rumor”???
Public rumor is what Judge Julian uses when she devolves into using left wing internet arguments.
Mark Finchem refers to Statute 38-503 in the lawsuit.
38-503. Conflict of interest; exemptions; employment prohibition
“A. Any public officer or employee of a public agency who has, or whose relative has, a substantial interest in any contract, sale, purchase or service to such public agency shall make known that interest in the official records of such public agency and shall refrain from voting upon or otherwise participating in any manner as an officer or employee in such contract, sale or purchase.
B. Any public officer or employee who has, or whose relative has, a substantial interest in any decision of a public agency shall make known such interest in the official records of such public agency and shall refrain from participating in any manner as an officer or employee in such decision.
C. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections A and B of this section, no public officer or employee of a public agency shall supply to such public agency any equipment, material, supplies or services, unless pursuant to an award or contract let after public competitive bidding, except that:
1. A school district governing board may purchase, as provided in sections 15-213 and 15-323, supplies, materials and equipment from a school board member.
2. Political subdivisions other than school districts may purchase through their governing bodies, without using public competitive bidding procedures, supplies, materials and equipment not exceeding three hundred dollars in cost in any single transaction, not to exceed a total of one thousand dollars annually, from a member of the governing body if the policy for such purchases is approved annually.
D. Notwithstanding subsections A and B of this section and as provided in sections 15-421 and 15-1441, the governing board of a school district or a community college district may not employ a person who is a member of the governing board or who is the spouse of a member of the governing board.”
Has Judge Julian read the entire statute?
Because she only addressed subsection A in her ruling.
Subsection B is the part that Katie Hobbs violated!
“B. Any public officer or employee who has, or whose relative has, a substantial interest in any decision of a public agency shall make known such interest in the official records of such public agency and shall refrain from participating in any manner as an officer or employee in such decision.”
It is abundantly clear that Katie Hobbs violated subsection B and that Judge Julian ignored it.
Judge Melissa Iyer Julian of the Maricopa County Superior Court is clearly corrupt and or incompetent and should be removed from the bench immediately!
